
Contents

©2000 Massachusetts Institute of Technology

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher.

Chapters 1, 7, 8, 12, and 13 of this book are revised and/or expanded versions of articles from a special issue of *Inquiry*, volume 39, number 2, June 1996, edited by Andrew Light and David Rothenberg, reprinted by permission of Scandinavian University Press, Oslo, Norway.

This book was set in Sabon by Crane Composition, Inc., and was printed and bound in the United States of America. Printed on recycled paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Beneath the surface : critical essays in the philosophy of deep ecology / edited by Eric Katz, Andrew Light, and David Rothenberg.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-262-61149-X (alk. paper)

1. Deep ecology—Philosophy. 2. Human ecology—Philosophy.

I. Katz, Eric, 1952— II. Light, Andrew, 1966—

III. Rothenberg, David, 1962—

GE195.B463 2000

179'.1—dc21

99-41517

CIP

- About the Contributors · vii
- Introduction: Deep Ecology as Philosophy ix
Eric Katz, Andrew Light, and David Rothenberg
- I Deep Ecology and Its Critics 1
- 1 How Wide Is Deep Ecology? 3
John Clark
- 2 Against the Inevitability of Anthropocentrism 17
Eric Katz
- 3 A Critique of Deep Green Theory 43
William Grey
- 4 Deep Ecology, Deep Pockets, and Deep Problems: A Feminist
Ecosocialist Analysis 59
Val Plumwood
- 5 Ontological Determinism and Deep Ecology: Evading the Moral
Questions? 85
Mathew Humphrey
- 6 In Defense of Deep Ecology: An Ecofeminist Response to a Liberal
Critique 107
Ariel Salleh
- 7 Callicott and Naess on Pluralism 125
Andrew Light
- II New Horizons for Deep Ecology 149
- 8 No World but in Things: The Poetry of Naess's Concrete Contents 151
David Rothenberg
- 9 Possible Political Problems of Earth-Based Religiosity 169
Michael E. Zimmerman

| | | |
|----|--|-----|
| 10 | The Postmodernism of Deep Ecology, the Deep Ecology of Postmodernism, and Grand Narratives | 195 |
| | Arran Gare | |
| 11 | Deep Ecology and Desire: On Naess and the Problem of Consumption | 215 |
| | Jonathan Maskit | |
| 12 | <i>Bhagavadgītā</i> , Ecosophy T, and Deep Ecology | 231 |
| | Knut A. Jacobsen | |
| 13 | A State of Mind Like Water: Ecosophy T and the Buddhist Traditions | 253 |
| | Deane Curtin | |
| 14 | Deep Ecology and Its Social Philosophy: A Critique | 269 |
| | Bron Taylor | |
| | Bibliography | 301 |
| | Index | 321 |

About the Contributors

John Clark is Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University, New Orleans, and also teaches in the Environmental Studies Program. He is the author of several books, including *The Philosophical Anarchism of William Godwin* (1977); *The Anarchist Moment: Reflections on Culture, Nature and Power* (1984); and *La Pensée Sociale d'Elisée Reclus: Géographe Anarchiste* (1996). He has edited or coedited *Renewing the Earth: The Promise of Social Ecology* (1990); *Les Français des États-Unis: D'Hier à Aujourd'hui* (1994); and *Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology* (2nd ed., 1998).

Deane Curtin is Raymond and Florence Sponberg Chair of Ethics at Gustavus Adolphus College. He is the author of *Chinnagounder's Challenge: The Question of Ecological Citizenship* (1999) and coeditor of *Cooking, Eating, Thinking: Transformative Philosophies of Food* (1992).

Arran Gare is Senior Lecturer, Swinburne University, Australia. He is the author of several books, including *Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis* (1995) and *Nihilism Inc.: Environmental Destruction and the Metaphysics of Sustainability* (1996), and the coeditor of *Environmental Philosophy* (1983).

William Grey is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, Australia.

Mathew Humphrey is Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Nottingham in the United Kingdom.

Knut A. Jacobsen is Associate Professor in the Department of the History of Religions, University of Bergen, Norway. He is the author of *Prakṛti in Sāṃkhya-Yoga: Material Principle, Religious Experience, Ethical Implications* (1999).

Eric Katz is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Science, Technology, and Society Program at the New Jersey Institute of Technology. He is the author of *Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and Natural Community* (1997) and the coeditor (with Andrew Light) of *Environmental Pragmatism* (1996).

54. David Rothenberg, "No World but in Things: The Poetry of Naess's Concrete Contents," *Inquiry* 39 (1996): 261.
55. Rothenberg, "Introduction," in Naess, *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle*, p. 2. Emphasis added.
56. Naess, "Beautiful Action," p. 71. Emphasis added.
57. Ibid.
58. Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
59. This is not an uncontroversial claim. See John Gray, *Mill on Liberty: A Defence*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1996), for an argument that Mill is interested in the self-realization of individuals. However, what is important from our perspective is that even then, Gray takes Mill to argue that each individual has a unique form of self-realization, and that there is no fixed end state to which individuals develop. Thus Gray's interpretation does not impact upon the substance of my argument.
60. John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1910).
61. There is a question here as to whether it is possible to cleave to a broadly "middle" position, by which one could still cleave to the "Self-realization" thesis, yet hold that for the good of the development of moral personality in human beings, it is essential that people achieve Self-realization autonomously. Self-realization can be of value only if achieved in this way; thus it is harnessed to a positive appraisal of autonomy. Such a position would be problematic. If one has a perfectionist account of the good human life, how can it be treating people as morally considerable individuals to allow them to fail to achieve such a life through their own weaknesses or misconceptions? One would surely have to value autonomy *over* Self-realization to hold this position, and be prepared to accept the ecological and social consequences of a widespread failure to achieve Self-realization. This would be quite removed from the position of deep ecologists such as Naess.
62. Naess, "Beautiful Actions," p. 69.
63. Raz, *Morality of Freedom*, pp. 375–376. Raz is not referring here to the specific deep ecological version of the Self-realization thesis, but his comments are as applicable to it as to any other version.
64. Rudolf Bahro, *Avoiding Social and Ecological Disaster: The Politics of World Transformation* (Bath, UK: Gateway Books, 1994), pp. 14–15. The "Megamachine" is essentially Bahro's shorthand for industrial society.
65. Barrès's epistemology with regard to this was intuitionist; one cannot come to "know" one's Self at the merely rational level. Deep ecology literature is redolent with the same assumption.

6

In Defense of Deep Ecology: An Ecofeminist Response to a Liberal Critique

Ariel Salleh

Context

It is curious to reflect on the growth of gender awareness in deep ecology now, fifteen years after the "Deeper Than Deep Ecology" challenge. Innocent of the academic microscope that would be applied to it, that blithe little rhetorical nudge to our deep ecological brothers led first to uproar, then to debate between ecofeminists and deep ecologists lasting over a decade. In the meantime, while the feuding parties have made personal peace, I am not sure that the political message of "the ecofeminist connection" has been fully received.¹

This chapter will revisit the ecofeminist call for deep ecological consciousness-raising. But it will do so tangentially, by way of philosopher Mathew Humphrey's liberal argument that the deep ecologists' "identification with nature" fails to meet requirements of an adequate moral theory.² In response to Humphrey's critique, I will suggest that if deep ecological concerns were reformulated in terms of an embodied materialism, this ecofeminist approach might deepen the ethic of deep ecology and its epistemology while helping to keep liberal critics at bay.

Philosophy as Social Practice

As I noted in "Class, Race, and Gender Discourse in the Ecofeminism/Deep Ecology Debate" (see note 1), the conservative character of some deep ecological theory very likely reflects its social origins. Professional philosophy is arguably an elitist pursuit, removed from the menial world. It depends on the presence of a social underclass of other humans who labor in the realms of necessity—productive and reproductive. Without a historically established division between mental and manual labor, the conditions for formal philosophic production would not exist.

Unwittingly, philosophers may perpetuate materially oppressive social relations marked by class, race, and gender differences—an ethical dilemma that touches the discipline at its very core. This in turn gives rise to an epistemological problem if the language of philosophy continues to reflect the sociological positioning of a particular grouping. By default, that language may be counter-productive to the search for truth. Words as tools lose their incisive edge when terminology becomes a self-referential idealism, removed from the daily materiality of most people's lives.

As an applied endeavor, ecophilosophy is a step in the right direction; deep ecology that would undo the traditional schism between Humanity and Nature is another. An ecofeminist standpoint can ground philosophical reason even further, because the women of our generation, struggling to be heard beyond the sphere of reproduction, have been doing a great deal of thinking about what it is that links the internal relations of Humanity and Nature—the body.

My own writing has focused on what can be called an embodied materialism.³ This builds on Marx's profound understanding of the dialectic between our practical actions in the world and the form that our thought processes take. However, Marx's model was too much centered on the production of things—"men's work," as distinct from women's socially given reproductive activities. So, as an ecofeminist, I have come to deconstruct the gaps in that historical materialism—the philosophical silence on Women and Nature, marginalized subjects in an otherwise radical analysis.

Now, the term "social reproduction" means to be engaged in nurturing living processes by enhancing our human interchange with nature. Domestic work still has this function inasmuch as women cook and clean, tend young and old, and engage in sexual and reproductive activities. Subsistence farming and hunter-gathering by men can also be said to be reproductive labor. Obviously, women and men caught up in urban consumer societies have less give-and-take with external nature than cottage-dwelling folk once did. But in the international division of labor, the domestic functions of indigenous peoples and Third World farmers are still bound up in care for earthly cycles, albeit increasingly compromised by the spread of maldevelopment from the West.

In conventional Marxism, where production is the privileged category, the reproduction of daily needs and the reproduction of future generations is a taken-for-granted background "condition of production." But my point here is that these socially reproductive labors—whether by mothers, wives, black housekeepers, or slaves—are just as much a condition of philosophic production as of factory production. At further remove in the global economic gestalt, we can acknowledge colonized others, whose labors or lands generate the re-

source surplus from which First World citizens draw affluent lifestyles and leisured hours.

These facts about the unethical framework in which the philosophical enterprise takes place are well known. Among deep ecologists, Arne Naess's account in *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle* is full of illustrative instances of the 20:80 thesis.⁴ But what I want to attend to here is the discursive positioning and reflexivity of deep ecology, liberalism, and ecofeminism within this global context. I will propose that when philosophy externalizes its own social framework from the exercise of reason, it may lapse into a form of idealism, thereby undermining the integrity and accuracy of analysis. Therefore, in striving for ethical and epistemological adequacy, both liberal philosophers and deep ecologists might benefit from using an embodied materialism.

Identification with Nature and the Liberal Critique

My observation is that most ecophilosophical writing is still formulated in idealist terms as distinct from speaking in a way that reflects our material engagement with, and embodiment in, nature. Nevertheless, Naess and other deep ecologists have moved significantly toward materialism by making sensory experience of habitat and "self-realization" based on rootedness in place prerequisite to right ecological action. In this philosophy, an expansive identification with nature breaks down the divide between I and not-I, creating an intuitive sense of rightness that some call "beautiful action." The ethic takes form as "Self should act as self is." Desire for embodiment in deep ecological reason is plain in Naess's assertion that ecodefense is self-defense, and also in Bill Devall's description of the ecosystem as "part of my body." Andrew McLaughlin is another who sees "care for other life forms, engendered by an identification with place."⁵

Naess's ontology embraces reality as a relational net, an apperceptive hierarchy of gestalts combining sensory and evaluative elements simultaneously. Thus deep ecology is implicitly normative and rejects the conventional opposition of fact and value as an artifact of abstract thinking. Naess departs from the "spectral" mathematized tradition of science, favoring "mythic" forms of narrative culturally imbued with a sense of place. With their notion of "dwellers in the land," bioregionalists like Kirkpatrick Sale join deep ecologists, urging that belongingness and psychological health are shattered by urbanization and industrial development.⁶ By this logic, identification of Human self with Natural milieu provides an axiomatic or self-evident basis for actions that are environmentally moral.

Mathew Humphrey develops an interesting critique of deep ecology around what he sees as its ontological determinism and associated evasion of moral questions.⁷ Followers of deep ecology maintain that there is no need to lay down moral imperatives if the self is fully realized in desiring survival of the wider biotic community. But Humphrey rejects this stance as environmentally determinist: to assume that we are what our surroundings make us and to assume that beautiful, self-authentic acts are a sufficient guide, is to fall well short of a morally informed attitude.

Humphrey argues that the deep ecologists' goal of personal maturation toward identification with nature is a closed, totalitarian concept of self-realization, and by implication manipulative. A developmental psychology must be open-ended, he maintains, if it is to properly equip us for an autonomous life. For the *Gesellschaft* rather than *Gemeinschaft* man, individual autonomy and freedom of choice are paramount considerations.

It follows in the liberal schema that a deliberative weighing of options will be an essential part of taking moral action. And this in turn must entail the possibility of risking all, or choosing to act unethically. Finally, Humphrey believes that a deep ecological ethic of intuitive identification fails as moral discourse because by definition ethics must involve negotiation with "an other." In a related vein, Humphrey points out that beautiful actions framed by parochial sentiments are lacking because they demand no capacity for self-detachment and reflexive awareness on the part of the moral agent.

Some Ecofeminist Reflections on Idealism

It should be noted that each of Humphrey's criticisms of the ethical basis of deep ecology focuses on anthropocentric or human concerns. In other words, regardless of the rightness or wrongness of his case, it does not deal with the extent to which deep ecology might be an adequate ethic for nature beyond the human. Making the same point in ecofeminist shorthand, I would say that Humphrey's scoping is pre-ecological; it is couched in the prevailing ideology that sets men over and above nature and women—Man/Woman=Nature.⁸ That Humphrey's position on nature is a traditional one is clear from his tendency to treat it at one remove: as "landscape," "surroundings," "nonhuman environment."

Despite old tensions over gender awareness in deep ecology, most ecofeminists endorse its insight into our human identity with nature and the ethic of care that stems from this. Few ecofeminists will feel comfortable about describing this attachment as symbolic, though. Too often, deep ecologists seem to

lapse into abstract, psychological, or spiritual terms to describe "transpersonal" reconnection or material embeddedness. Their new Man=Nature attitudes are redolent with passively specular images of men "waking up," "suddenly seeing," or "admiring" nature, revealing a residual idealism in deep ecological thought.

Sometimes deep ecology reads as endorsing a narrative of a world spirit suddenly entering a man's mind and providing insight. Yet most of Naess's writing is quite materialist. Consider his relative prioritization of the sphere of natural necessity over that of human freedom, or his practical perception that we come to understand the value of energy resources through gathering wood to keep warm. Moreover, in political communication, Naess is ever the gentle pragmatist, gauging the psychological limits of his opponents' capacity for the deep ecological challenge.

Again, Naess rejects the idealism or naive positivism of Western science and its static worldview in which "a stone is a stone" and nothing else. He fears that this loss of relational comprehension, a "verbal deterioration of *gestalts*," must inevitably lead to a deterioration of culture. Unlike Humphrey's characterization of the *gestalt* as totalizing, ingrained, and habit-forming, Naess sees *gestalt* constellations as experientially created ways of tilting at expected, culturally idealized boundaries. Naess's relational ontology, with its acknowledgment of the both/and logic of contradiction, converges with a dialectical apprehension of the world. The weft that is missing from the weave of deep ecology is a gendered perspective. I shall return to this later.

In the meantime, a liberal critique of the deep ecological ethic will reveal a variety of cultural idealism through its unexamined dualisms. The liberal ontology adopts a split between self and other while its epistemology splits fact and value. This is no coincidence, for, as sociologists of knowledge observe, the fractured thought style replicates the context of its ideological production in the economic division between mental and manual labor. Similarly, an ego psychology reflects a competitive social structure that is not safe, and where the healthy condition is exemplified by an individual with strong defenses against the other.

Let us stay with the background conditions of liberalism for a moment. One can make a case that this political philosophy was generated historically as capitalist patriarchal discourse premised on a life that is "nasty, brutish, and short," one in which competition between men is essential to survival. In this avowedly "evolutionary" struggle for emancipation and progress, a class-based division of labor was part of the natural order of things. For one class of humans to enjoy a status as fully cultured, rational selves, its opposite number

would labor as a class in the realm of necessity. Compared with the fully fledged ethical citizen, these others—mothers, wives, housekeepers, workers, or slaves—were “closer to nature.” “Human resources” is the word today. Nevertheless, the promise of liberalism was that given the innate competitiveness of human beings, achievement of life’s rewards was open to all, at least in principle.

The weft that is missing from the weave of liberalism is more multistranded than the one missing from deep ecology. It is an acknowledgment of the culturally imbued power of a privileged minority to define, impose, and manipulate class, race, gender, and species differences. Humphrey’s presentation of Naess’s deep ecology as based on “internalized norms” turns its back on the internalized norms that determine and prop up Western liberalism: a predilection for individual autonomy and free choice—literally at any cost. And we know who has historically borne the cost, whether it be counted in labor, time, or pollution. Most “others” in contemporary capitalist patriarchal societies are menial workers: women, indigenous peoples, and other species. I am not suggesting that Humphrey accepts this status quo; what I am saying is that these facts need to be kept up front when we argue about moral questions in the context of liberalism.

Humphrey is right in wanting people to have an opportunity to consider their reasons for acting as they do. I am just not convinced that his own position is as reflexive as it might be. As things stand, the material power relation that may exist between self and other is protected by a positivist separation of fact and value which keeps historical context clear of the discourse on ethics. In light of this, I find an ironic moment in Humphrey’s dismissal of deep ecology as solipsistic: if right action is an expression of the self as is, then it depends on “who you are.” Humphrey insists that in philosophy, motive can not be derived from identity, but my own sense is that the liberal notion of morality is highly self-referential. Consider the line that the urbane citizen properly weighs his moral judgment, whereas the indigenous ecologist acts out of a nondeliberative oral tradition. Surely such a thesis depends entirely for its plausibility on “who you are.”

The liberal standpoint is arguably an environmentally determined ideology designed to reinforce the objectives of a particular Western economic system. On this basis, can it really be claimed to be less manipulative than Naess’s theory of identification with nature is? Moreover, in a rapidly globalizing world, arguments about place are very salient with neocolonial struggles coming to the fore. Yet the implication of Humphrey’s critique of deep ecology is that culturally embedded mythic narratives which may shape the ecological acts of some indigenous peoples are nonreflexive, and thus nonmoral. Here, I feel that

Humphrey’s stance ceases to offer open-ended dialogue with the other. What is needed at this juncture are reconciliatory moves to foster international tolerance and grassroots participatory democracy.

Liberal morality is not only class-based, it is raced or Eurocentric in its bias, and it is also gendered. As Carole Pateman points out, while liberalism is premised on a social contract negotiated between free and equal citizens, this moral foundation of Enlightenment society was in fact contracted only between fellow citizens.⁹ So when Humphrey criticizes Naess’s primitive intuitionism and says that his ethical position sacrifices justice to identity, the double standard comes very close. What remains under cover here is the extent to which the liberal political stance is itself of mythic origin, socially determined and intuitively plausible to middle-class men of the so-called developed world.

Vis-à-vis nature and “other” species, Humphrey reminds us that liberalism is characterized by the strategic calculus and deliberative optimization, including a right to choose unethical action. What follows from this freewheeling morality is the risking of resources as an essential component of a life well lived. Humphrey goes on to amplify his critique of deep ecology with a quote from Rudolf Bahro: “Correct, we are all part of the trees and the trees are part of us. But it is equally important to recognise . . . that we are also part of the Megamachine, and the Megamachine is part of us.” I feel this quote works against Humphrey as much as it works for him, for as Larry Lohmann has noted:

Only by atomizing tasks, redefining women as unproductive and separating workers from the moral authority, crafts and natural surroundings created by their communities, has it been possible to transform people into modern universal individuals.¹⁰

In other words, liberalism, despite the best intentions of its founding fathers, is implicated in material circumstances that are socially unjust and ecologically destructive. In contradistinction to this failed political formula, ecofeminists ask that we take note of a global class uncompromised by the rewards of the Megamachine. Whether subsistence farmers, hunter-gatherers, or domestics, these meta-industrial workers have hands-on knowledge of sustaining labors in a joint metabolism with nature. Moreover, if democracy still counts for anything, this class constitutes a statistical majority globally. So in the search for an epistemology and ethic that is both practical and just, it makes sense to heed its voice.

In making my case for an embodied materialism experientially grounded in meta-industrial nurture, I want to point out that we are all environmentally determined—to a degree—but also that we daily remake the conditions of our existence. This is to endorse Humphrey’s openness thesis and his objection to any

“ontological shortcut which assumes a fixed ‘end state’ to human development.” The dialectical notion of praxis does imply a continuous—culturally mediated—physical conversation between our bodies and their milieu. Labor in its various forms provides the possibility of grounded solidarity in our identity with nature. This is not a self-realization to be thought up or intuited in pure idealist fashion, nor, following the deep ecological imagination, will it necessarily come with an individual’s maturation in the world.

An Embodied Materialism

As I argue in my book *Ecofeminism as Politics: Nature, Marx and the Post-modern*, it is usually grassroots housewives, as opposed to so-called emancipated feminists, who are the strongest fighters for ecology.¹¹ In the Third World, subsistence farmers and indigenous hunter-gatherers come to environmental politics with clarity and a materially grounded conviction gained in their communities. Each of these groups also has a moral sensibility finely honed by experiences of exploitation and suffering in a global economic system that is designed primarily to benefit metropolitan, middle-class men.

Now I want to explore the possibility that the deep ecological sense of place might be more usefully formulated as a theory of working in/with nature. According to the *Concise Oxford Dictionary*, the word “indigenous” means “native, belonging naturally, to soil.” So women’s reproductive labors almost universally mediate nature for men. In a sense, women within nature and nature within women have coevolved reciprocal practices over centuries. This nature-woman-labor nexus certainly supports a proposition that ecofeminist insights constitute an indigenous knowledge informed by hands-on experiences that are marginalized and devalued by urban industrial productivist economics.

Among housewives, the nexus includes the sensuality of birthing and suckling labors; historically assigned household chores; gardening or making goods; creating and implanting meanings in the next generation. Similarly, peasant and indigenous men and women are organically and discursively implicated in the material rhythms of enduring time, and like domestic workers, they develop practical expertise grounded in that materiality. Good farmers foster the earth to metabolize these connections; women give up their bodies as alchemists to make life.

The enduring time horizons of these meta-industrial workers are not compatible with the truncated time sense of a profit-driven free market. Nor do they find the controlling, analytic, and linear character of the scientific method appropriate to the maintenance of living things. Remember, too, that Western

science with its idealized separations of subject and object, fact and value developed historically by elective affinity with liberalism. In contrast to the self-interested maximizations known as “best practice,” sustaining labors involve following through on long-term goals in complex relational systems. In contrast to planning with crude statistical indicators, the indigenous labor process knows its material intimately.

A finely reasoned account of vernacular labors “immersed in details of the physical world” can be found in philosopher Sara Ruddick’s book *Maternal Thinking*.¹² As Ruddick reminds the reader, maintaining a household requires harmonizing a complex of subsystems, as well as considerable decision-making and diplomatic skills. To reappraise social reproduction this way is thus not to argue from victimhood, that oppressed women have a monopoly on good behavior; nor is it to fall back into unreconstructed masculinist readings of some innate, essential “naturalness” or pro-family assertions about moral superiority of the female sex.

Nor is this a case of what Humphrey criticizes in deep ecology, an extraction of motive from identity. Rather, the argument makes a materialist epistemological claim about those who work with head and hand in a self-directed way, and the accuracy of their cognitive capacities and skills. This unique consciousness is discouraged under the capitalist patriarchal division of labor. Thus, while I agree with Humphrey that flexibility is a most precious “resource,” when it is practiced as an embodied materialism, it is the antithesis of the liberal trend to labor specialization. The latter only leads to alienation and entropy—in physical and philosophic systems.

Holding as Epistemology and Ethic

Ruddick’s concept of “holding” is especially relevant to an ecofeminist defense of deep ecology against liberalism. “To hold means to minimize risk and to reconcile differences rather than to sharply accentuate them. Holding is a way of seeing with an eye toward maintaining the minimal harmony, material resources, and skills necessary for sustaining a child in safety. It is the attitude elicited by ‘world protection, world-preservation, world repair . . . the invisible weaving of a frayed and threadbare family life.’”¹³

Paradoxically, while minimizing risk, holding is the ultimate expression of adaptability. As opposed to the physicist’s separation of space-time, interconnectedness is commonsense in the mater/reality of those who hold things together. With ecofeminism, this precautionary principle comes to be applied beyond home and neighborhood to moral action in society at large.

But holding practice is more than a human morality; it is the quintessential work of resisting environmental entropy. Australian indigenous workers traditionally practice a kind of holding, and this, too, nurtures sustainability.¹⁴ Unlike the liberal man of property, Aboriginal peoples do not package land with neat little titles for fear of losing it; rather, they move through country in the knowledge that nature will replenish and provide for them when they return. Self-managed Aboriginal provisioning richly meets many needs at once: subsistence, learning, participation, innovation, ritual, identity and belonging, freedom, partnership with habitat.¹⁵ On the other hand, the engineered satisfiers of modern industrial societies, like bureaucracies or cars, cost great effort and frequently end up sabotaging the very convenience they were designed for.

Reproductive labors are embedded in a matrix of social relations that in turn are sustained by subsistence activities embedded in cycles of biological time. In the caregiving labor that Ruddick names "mothering practice," a woman (or man) has no choice but to deal with material before her (him). Unlike the physicist or social scientist, she cannot invent categories to deny what is natural. What characterizes her understanding is reciprocity with what nature provides. Nancy Hartsock has noted how this gentle labor by mediation distinguishes enduring work from proletarian labor, which under the liberal's free-market growth ethic must break nature's back at the master's command. Evelyn Fox Keller's notion of a nongendered science repeats the theme of subject-object collaboration. Nature is known as a subject with a heart of its own, a heart that pulses through our own body cells.¹⁶

Humphrey would probably be in agreement with political theorist Mary Dietz's claim that an ethic of care is undemocratic because it privileges qualities of a particular group.¹⁷ But the learned qualities of holding labors are open to any group that chooses to work at the socially constructed margin where culture meets nature. The ecofeminist respect for enduring time is profoundly democratic. It challenges all existing political stratifications, including the split between men's and women's traditional labor roles, as much as the speciesist split between Humanity and other Nature.

The temporal structuration of common household activities and environmental exchanges are each, in part, independent of discourse, persisting as "complex orders of causality." I believe that Naess's and other deep ecologists' celebration of place can be deepened by taking such reproductive labors seriously, not only because on equity grounds it is morally desirable to respect what women and indigenous peoples do, but also because the time frame of these interactions exists beyond that which directs the sphere of public decision-

making. In other words, there are epistemological benefits to be gleaned from understanding social reproduction.

Living things are joined across time as well as space; this is an indwelling structure invisible to positivist science, which prioritizes sight over all other senses. Seemingly oblivious to the pulse of life, Western reason and its instruments cut across nature's intricate score. Consider agroforestry, mining, nuclear weapons, road transport, genetic engineering, where the plan is management but complex metabolic rhythms are disrupted and ecological disintegration results. The dis/located approach of professional expertism generates merely an illusion of human choice and control. But the mythology is protected by naming its unanticipated consequences "accidents."

Some ecofeminists use web imagery for the cycles of wholeness and decay, entropy and growth. I imagine these organic, self-feeding transformations following a holographic complex of Möbius loops. Alongside the one-dimensional reasoning of liberal philosophy, ego psychology, and the engineering mind-set that furnishes it, many more people globally access another conceptual space, one that is very apposite to ecological thinking. This relational logic takes in its goal by concentric rather than direct scan; the object is experienced from several tangential points, kaleidoscopically. Knowledge rests not on mere appearance, formal visual properties, but is derived from touch, or from the even more diffuse kinesthetic modality that responds to pulse. The effect is an empathic, reflexive logic without incisive categorical boundaries between the knowing subject-in-process, the object-in-process, and its representation.¹⁸

Identity/Nonidentity

This account of ecofeminist epistemology circles back to the ontology of internal relations. Naess's position has been made more explicit since his 1989 book, and it is now clear how this approach to deep ecology might marry with an embodied materialism.¹⁹ The convergence is underscored by deep ecological use of the gestalt constellation and the both/and logic of identity/nonidentity. Unfortunately, not all deep ecologists adopt this approach. And even Naess's formulation continues at variance with ecofeminist reasoning because it elides the implications of gender difference. A fully embodied materialism will address the masculinist dualisms of Man/Woman, History/Nature, signifier/signified, replacing these with a metabolism of subject-in-field, the very body of the noun being dissolved in the liquid realism of nonidentity.

As ecofeminists discover, the Western privileging of solid land over liquid water and the suppressed temporality of ecological systems by modern economics and science have served to delete both feminine difference and nature's diversity. For just as political "difference" can be defined by the life-affirming practices and labor in enduring time that men but mostly women do, so "diversity" is integral to orchestrating life. And here I come to the nub of long-standing ecofeminist grievances about the hypocritical moment in deep ecology. To quote Vandana Shiva on capitalist patriarchal Eurocentrism generally: "The construction of women as 'the second sex' is linked to the same inability to cope with difference as is the development paradigm that leads to the displacement and extinction of diversity in the biological world."²⁰

The Eurocentric and patriarchal plausibility structures of both liberalism and deep ecology, each in its own way, are marred by this failure to cope with difference. The liberal addresses the human subject as rational citizen, but tacitly a masculine one. And while deep ecologists genuinely reach out for knowledge of the body as nature, this communion remains constrained by the conventional Man/Woman=Nature ideology. Liberalism and deep ecology both effectively bypass "the body" as material bridge between thought and habitat. The body has traditionally been constructed in the West as women's sphere, and so by definition not a topic for philosophy or politics.²¹ Here we encounter another liberal dualism—the ostensibly universal public/private divide, which protects the public face of mastery from acknowledging its private substrate.

Given all this, where will Woman=Nature stand in a scheme of justice based on shared parochial identity? In this respect, Humphrey's test of the deep ecologists' ethic of place resonates with ecofeminist concerns. He asks if this empathic morality would allow the brutal murder of a woman to be passed over for the sake of preserving "local loyalties." As most ecofeminists will acknowledge, were it not for the emergence of abstract Enlightenment principles like human equality, women today would not have their voices heard, let alone be in a position to demand justice for abused sisters. Recently, feminists have managed to bring rape onto the international agenda as a war crime, but such is the force of liberal morality that this violence remains common practice in metropolitan and peripheral cultures alike. We urgently need a politics informed by deeper understandings, libidinal ones.

Humphrey's idealism and Naess's ungendered identity perspective are both silent on the highly problematic character of self-realization and autonomous development for women inside the master society and for indigenous people outside of it. Here I shall use the feminine experience as ideal typical marginality, but the indigenous experience of identity/nonidentity takes a parallel form

structurally. The point is that the phenomenon of identification with nature and place seems to be conceptualized by deep ecologists in a naively positivist, one-dimensional way, whereas Western culture is constructed with two gender forms Man/Woman.

To restate the ecofeminist case: the Eurocentric dualism is maintained by a discourse promoting two parallel "realities":

man, culture, subject, mind, public, positive, identity

woman, nature, object, body, private, negative, nonidentity

If a man identifies with nature, this will challenge the hegemonic conception of masculinity that normally accords his gender group power "over and above women and nature." In *Ecofeminism as Politics*, I use the mock formula Man/Woman=Nature to represent this popular ontology. The identification of deep ecological men with nature is thus a straightforwardly radical step that breaks with the M/W=N determination, at least in part. The part that still seems to be intact is that women remain silenced by the /.

Returning to Humphrey's ethical exemplar involving the local murder of a woman, his text moves between an argument about a man's regional identification and one about identity with local cronies. In my view, it is more convincingly a story of "mateship," as we call it Down Under: bonding between brothers, Man to Man. Conversely, the identification with place urged by deep ecologists describes a Man=Nature bond. As such, it is structurally quite dissimilar from Humphrey's case and the M/W=N pattern of liberalism. Moreover, deep ecologists do not need to cover for nature in the way that regular guys do for each other, because nature does not commit crimes upon us.

As remarked earlier, men's self-realization by expanded self does nothing to alter the ongoing invisibility and "nonidentity" of Woman=Nature. This was why my "Deeper Than Deep Ecology" essay was called for in the first place—half of humanity had been left out of the "total field." Against the rather disembodied and idealized transpersonal liberation of deep ecological men, women have a much less easy time of it. Ever strangers in cultural schemes evolved at men's convenience, women are now thrown into acute personal conflict by the ecological crisis.

This is because the liberal feminist principle of equality offers women an option to become emancipated, but only by positioning themselves over and above nature as men do. Women choosing this way will find any argument for ecofeminism as an indigenous knowledge very unpalatable indeed. Third World elite women who believe themselves emancipated by high-tech gadgetry also will object to it. Thus, while a man's decision to identify with nature is clearly a

radical move, when a woman affirms her identity with nature, she risks reinforcing her traditionally oppressed position, since W=N is outside the full human status enjoyed by men.²²

Nevertheless, for ecofeminists—after much deliberation—there is no doubt that our relational choice to identify with nature is in itself “a right reason” and “holding” is the form that self-realization takes. But younger women can find the pull between conflicting liberal and ecofeminist standpoints very problematic. A grounded awareness of the critically privileged nonidentity of belonging in/with nature seems to come easier to women experienced in sustaining labors. Or perhaps it is the reflexive practice of holding that enables women to resolve these contradictory tensions.

Going back to the relational web and its logic of identity/nonidentity: epistemologically speaking, women get to be experts in thinking about nonidentical things. And this may be why men so often charge them with being unable to “make up their minds”; everything is both this/and that. Caring for sick infants and aging parents puts women in touch with permeability and contamination. Bodies on the margin of nature dribble, smell, ooze, flake, even decay before our eyes. Women have the patriarchally accorded privilege of holding together the fragments of human nonidentity in the mesh of enduring time. Men bleed, urinate, ejaculate, too, but the discourse of mastery forces them to be contemptuous of bodily flows. Capitalist patriarchal languages and institutions offer men an armory of externalizing, idealizing gestures to bolster their separateness from matter. And what they get from it is desensitization, a false sense of individualism, crippling loneliness, and destructive compensatory drives.

Different ways of living and knowing yield different approaches to ethics. For example, holding practices open people to a self-consciousness quite at odds with the cogito of the masculine unitary subject. Women, says Carol Gilligan, are inclined to work out their ethical responsibilities by integrating thought, feeling, and relational context. An ecofeminist ethic calls us away from strategic calculation of optimizations and abstract formulas like rights, into an extrapolation of caring experience.²³ Holding, as epistemology and ethic, is based neither on separation and control of others nor on some ephemeral cosmic fusion, but on practical deferral. It exemplifies a strong and flexible decentered subjectivity.

Against the liberal critique of empathic identification, I want to argue that moral action does not derive from idealized discursive constructs alone. Lohmann approaches this opinion when he says:

People seeking anti-global alliances are likely simply to have to drop the idea that there are going to be any interesting neutral criteria of rationality or democracy . . . [and] in-

stead content themselves with adopting *certain ethnocentric virtues of inquiry: watchfulness, curiosity, tolerance, patience, humour and open mindedness.*²⁴

As Marti Kheel observes, whether the fraternity of philosophers admits it or not, action based on rights is quietly prompted by an ethic of care.²⁵ The problem has been that practices such as watchfulness, patience, humor are qualities that characterize the material practices of social reproduction, the very background conditions that remain peripheral to the philosophic vision. Even Lohmann's statement seems to harbor an unexamined assumption based on the liberal private/public divide, that holding virtues are somehow “ethnocentric” and not “universal.”

An embodied materialism connotes the enfoldment of time in pleasure and suffering, hardiness and commitment, stability and security. These ways of being are the qualities of engagement that marginalized meta-industrial workers, women, and subsistence dwellers bring to their dialogue with nature. In contrast to the profoundly alienated proletariat of Marx's urban economic vision, such people carry an alternative way of knowing and doing, one that is sorely needed to build an Earth democracy. Today, when so many are dependent on a global division of labor to meet their daily needs, the liberal goal of autonomy is all but impossible. Substantively, Humphrey's meaning might be better served by words like “self-reliance” and “self-sufficiency.”

An ecofeminist transvaluation of the mode of reproduction coincides with development critic Wolfgang Sachs's respect for “societies which live graciously within their means, and for social changes which take their inspiration from indigenous ideas of the good and proper life.”²⁶ This does not mean going backward in history, as liberals, mainstream feminists, and other Western fundamentalists sometimes claim. It means questioning ingrained habits of thought and being more fully conscious of what we are about.

Conclusion

What is hopeful for a future symbiosis of deep ecology and ecofeminism is their shared theory of internal relations. Every one of my criticisms of deep ecology can be met if the logic of identity/nonidentity is carefully applied. So this essay is an invitation to both deep ecologists and their liberal critics to join ecofeminist endeavors. In valuing the embodied materialist practices and consciousness of people at the interface of Humanity and Nature, we encounter new truths about ourselves and unexpected ethical and epistemological insights. Furthermore, by any criterion, it is moral to give voice to those we presently resource as objects.

Notes

1. Ariel Salleh, "Deeper Than Deep Ecology: The Ecofeminist Connection," *Environmental Ethics* 6 (1984): 339–345. The paper was one of three that I read at the Environment Ethics and Ecology Conference, Australian National University, August 26–28, 1983. The other two papers were published as Ariel Salleh, "The Growth of Ecofeminism," *Chain Reaction* 36 (1984): 26–28, and "From Feminism to Ecology," *Social Alternatives* 4 (1984): 8–12. My ecofeminist critique of deep ecology addressed two texts: Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long Range Ecology Movement," *Inquiry* 16:1 (1973): 95–100; and Bill Devall, "The Deep Ecology Movement," *Natural Resources Journal* 20 (1980): 299–322. Writings in the debates among deep ecology, ecofeminism, and social ecology include the following: Alan Wittbecker, "Deep Anthropology, Ecology, and Human Order," *Environmental Ethics* 8 (1986): 261–270; Donald Davis, "The Seduction of Sophia," *Environmental Ethics* 8 (1986): 151–162; Michael E. Zimmerman, "Feminism, Deep Ecology and Environmental Ethics," *Environmental Ethics* 9 (1987): 21–44; Janet Biehl, "It's Deep but Is It Broad?" *Kick It Over* (Winter 1987): 2A–4A; Kirkpatrick Sale, "Ecofeminism: A New Perspective," *The Nation* (September 26, 1987): 302–305; Ynestra King, "What Is Ecofeminism?" *The Nation* (December 12, 1987): 702, 730–731; Jim Cheney, "Ecofeminism and Deep Ecology," *Environmental Ethics* 9 (1987): 115–145; Kirkpatrick Sale, "Deep Ecology and Its Critics," *The Nation* (May 14, 1988): 670–675; Murray Bookchin, "Social Ecology Versus Deep Ecology," *Socialist Review* 18 (1988): 9–29; Tim Luke, "The Dreams of Deep Ecology," *Telos* 76 (1988): 65–92; Marti Kheel, "Ecofeminism and Deep Ecology: Reflections on Identity and Difference," in *Reweaving the World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism*, edited by Irene Diamond and Gloria Orenstein (San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1999), 128–137; Warwick Fox, "The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate and Its Parallels," *Environmental Ethics* 11 (1989): 5–25; Sharon Doubiago, "Mama Coyote Talks to the Boys," in *Healing the Wounds*, edited by Judith Plant (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1989), 40–44; George Bradford, *How Deep Is Deep Ecology?* (Ojai, CA: Times Change Press, 1989); Ariel Salleh, "The Ecofeminism/Deep Ecology Debate: A Reply to Patriarchal Reason," *Environmental Ethics* 14 (1992): 195–215; Ariel Salleh, "Class, Race, and Gender Discourse in the Ecofeminism/Deep Ecology Debate," *Environmental Ethics* 15 (1993): 225–244; Val Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature* (London: Routledge, 1993); Deborah Slicer, "Is There an Ecofeminism-Deep Ecology Debate?" *Environmental Ethics* 17 (1995): 151–169.
2. Mathew Humphrey, "Ontological Determinism and Deep Ecology: Evading the Moral Questions?" chapter 5 in this volume.
3. My interest in an embodied materialism, critical theory, and logic of identity/non-identity has evolved through various articles since the early 1980s. These are cited in Ariel Salleh, *Ecofeminism as Politics: Nature, Marx and the Postmodern* (London: Zed; New York: St Martin's Press, 1997).
4. Arne Naess, *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle*, edited and translated by David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). The 20:80 thesis encapsu-
- lates the fact that 20 percent of the global population uses 80 percent of global resources, while 80 percent of the global population uses 20 percent of global resources.
5. Ibid.; Bill Devall, *Simple in Means, Rich in Ends* (Salt Lake City: Gibbs Smith, 1988), p. 59; Andrew McLaughlin, *Regarding Nature: Industrialism and Deep Ecology* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 207–208.
6. Kirkpatrick Sale, *Dwellers in the Land* (San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1985).
7. Humphrey, "Ontological Determinism and Deep Ecology."
8. The Man/Woman=Nature formula and its "1/0: body logic" are discussed in Salleh, *Ecofeminism as Politics*, chapters 3 and 4.
9. Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988).
10. Larry Lohmann, "Resisting Green Globalism," in *Global Ecology*, edited by Wolfgang Sachs, (London: Zed, 1994), p. 158.
11. The argument that follows is adapted from Salleh, *Ecofeminism as Politics*, chapter 9.
12. Sara Ruddick, *Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace* (Boston: Beacon, 1989). See also Gregory Bateson, *Steps Toward an Ecology of Mind* (St. Albans Herts, UK: Paladin, 1973), p. 437.
13. Ruddick, *Maternal Thinking*, 79. Her reference here is to Adrienne Rich, *Lies, Secrets, and Silence* (New York: Norton, 1979), p. 205.
14. Deborah Bird Rose, *Nourishing Terrains: Australian Aboriginal Views of Landscape and Wilderness* (Canberra: Australian Heritage Commission, 1996).
15. Manfred Max-Neef et al., *Human Scale Development* (New York: Apex, 1991).
16. Nancy Hartsock, *Money, Sex and Power* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1985); Evelyn Fox Keller, *A Feeling for the Organism* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1983).
17. Mary Dietz, "Citizenship with a Feminist Face: The problem with Maternal Thinking," *Political Theory* 13 (1985): 87.
18. Ariel Salleh, "Contribution to the Critique of Political Epistemology," *Thesis Eleven* 8 (1984): 33.
19. In my "Deeper than Deep Ecology," I criticized Naess's language for its instrumentalism. The criticism still applies to the essay in question, but needless to say, after a decade of debate, all of us choose our words more cautiously now.
20. Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva, *Ecofeminism* (London: Zed, 1993), p. 164.
21. However, the new social movements—feminist, gay, and indigenous—are now in-stating the body in politics.
22. This paradox was explored in Salleh, "Contribution to the Critique of Political Epistemology," but glossed over in "Deeper than Deep Ecology," so as not to overload a piece written for an activist conference. Nevertheless, "Contribution . . ." was cited in "Deeper . . ." for scholars wanting to pursue more theoretical aspects of the ecofeminist case. Unfortunately, few of my American sisters took the trouble. The resultant "critiques" of my supposed essentialism can be read in Karen Warren, ed., *Ecological Feminism* (New York: Routledge, 1994).

23. See Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984); Nel Noddings, *Caring* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
24. Lohmann, "Resisting Green Globalism," p. 167. Italics added.
25. Marti Kheel, "The Liberation of Nature: A Circular Affair," *Environmental Ethics* 7 (1985): 139–149.
26. Wolfgang Sachs, ed., *Global Ecology* (London: Zed, 1994), p. 4.